A case of the flu by Petsko, Gregory A
By the time you read this, the papers may be out and the 
moratorium  may  be  over,  though  I  hope  not.  (I’m  not 
speaking of a moratorium on debates among Republican 
presidential candidates - there isn’t one, although God 
knows we need it.) I’m referring to the 60-day mora  tor-
ium,  announced  on  January  20th  this  year,  on  certain 
types  of  experiments  that  could  be  carried  out  on  the 
genome of the influenza virus. Thirty-nine prominent flu 
researchers  agreed  to  this  voluntary  suspension  of 
research following disclosure of results of new studies on 
a potentially deadly strain of influenza - studies that a 
number  of  scientists,  laypeople,  and  public  officials 
feared  could  be  used  to  create  a  powerful  bioweapon. 
That moratorium included a temporary embargo on the 
publication  of  certain  experimental  details  of  those 
studies,  but  on  Friday  17  February,  the  World  Health 
Organization  (WHO),  which  sponsored  the  work, 
announced that the full details would be published within 
a few months.
To  understand  how  this  came  about,  it’s  useful  to 
review the modern history of US government regulation 
of scientific research and its publication. It begins with a 
meeting of molecular biologists at the Asilomar Confer-
ence Center in Pacific Grove, California, in 1975. This 
rustic setting has served as the site for many scientific 
symposia over the years, but the meeting in 1975 was 
convened by (as Robert Sinsheimer, one of the organizers, 
put it) “a bunch of academics - focused, idealistic, and 
often naïve - trying to do good, struggling to reconcile 
our conflicts, our apprehensions, our scientific ambitions 
our  careers,  our  sometimes  murky  sense  of  obligation 
and  emerge  with  a  practical  resolution.”  As  I  wrote 
10 years ago, in a Genome Biology column entitled An 
Asilomar  Moment,  the  resolution  they  were  trying  to 
reach  was  how  to  move  forward  safely  with  the  then 
newly developed recombinant DNA technology.
The earliest reports of techniques that allowed foreign 
genes to be expressed in bacteria had raised a chorus of 
alarms, both from professional Luddites and concerned 
citizens. Some molecular biologists themselves were also 
worried that they might accidentally produce dangerous 
microbes. Many more were worried that the growing fear 
would  cause  the  government  to  prohibit  recombinant 
DNA experiments altogether. And so a number of them 
met in Asilomar to figure out what to do, pledging to 
refrain  from  such  experiments  voluntarily  until  a 
consensus was reached on how to do them safely. The 
meeting was attended by both scientists and members of 
the press - a clever move because it guaranteed that the 
scientists would be able to make their case directly to the 
public. Over three-and-a-half days, the group of about 
150, which included most of the leaders in the emerging 
field, debated the risks, known and unknown, of cloning 
and manipulating foreign genes and expressing them in 
bacteria. The meeting ended with a series of resolutions 
that set forth guidelines for the safe conduct of recom-
binant  DNA  experiments.  The  resolutions  were  given 
force by linking their compliance with obtaining federal 
funds for any such research. Sinsheimer later said that 
this  result  was  “a  middle  ground…too  restrictive  for 
some, insufficiently restrictive for others…but Asilomar 
surely helped in many ways to launch the complex world 
of biotechnology we know today.” The Asilomar resolu-
tions headed off any draconian - and possibly misguided 
- regulation by the government, and reassured the public 
that the biologists not only would police themselves, but 
also would make public safety a key concern in future 
research.
And that was pretty much the story until the fall of 
2001, when the whole world changed. After the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September, a series of deaths from anthrax-
laced letters led to a wave of concern about bioterrorism, 
and  Congress  created  the  National  Scientific  Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). Among other tasks, the 
Board was charged with overseeing issues arising from 
the  publication  of  biological  research  that  could  con-
ceivably  be  misused  by  terrorists.  Although  the  over-
arching philosophy was that information should be freely 
available unless there was a high probably of danger from 
its dissemination, the Board can recommend to the US 
Government,  typically  in  the  form  of  the  National 
Institutes of Health, a partial or total embargo on any 
publication. The government agency then requests that 
the relevant journal(s) accede to that request. Note that  © 2010 BioMed Central Ltd
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NSABB hotly debated publication of the sequence of the 
1918 strain of the flu several years ago but suggested no 
redaction. As far as I know, the first time they have done 
so  was  this  December,  when,  in  a  highly  publicized 
statement,  NSABB  called  on  the  journals  Nature  and 
Science to censor the publication of two papers dealing 
with,  in  effect,  the  first  steps  toward  what  could  be 
termed the weaponization of the H5N1 strain of influ-
enza virus.
Influenza strains are named according to the particular 
genotype  of  two  proteins  on  the  viral  surface:  the 
neuraminidase (N) and the hemagglutinin (H). The 1918 
strain that killed at least 20 million people worldwide was 
H1N1,  as  is  the  (thankfully)  milder  version  circulating 
this winter. Most seasonal flu strains have low mortality 
rates  and  are  dangerous  primarily  to  the  elderly  and 
infirm. H5N1, also known as avian flu or bird flu, is a 
different  beast  altogether.  It  is  not  easily  transmissible 
from birds to people, and apparently not transmissible 
person-to-person, but when it does infect a human being, 
it often kills: almost two-thirds of the 570 recorded human 
cases  requiring  hospitalization  have  been  fatal  (for 
comparison,  the  case-fatality  rate  of  the  most  virulent 
strain of smallpox is around 30%). There is considerable 
controversy  over  the  true  case-fatality  rate  for  H5N1, 
because no one is certain how many symptomless infec-
tions there are, but there seems little doubt that, relative 
to other flu strains at least, H5N1 is probably unusually 
pathogenic in humans.
The two papers in question - one from a group headed 
by  Ron  Fouchier  of  the  Erasmus  Medical  Center  in 
Rotterdam, the other from Yoshihiro Kawaoka’s lab at the 
University of Wisconsin - described how a small number 
of amino acid changes in genes in H5N1 could produce a 
strain that was transmissible between people through the 
air (the workers actually showed transmission between 
co-caged  susceptible  ferrets,  but  when  it  comes  to 
influenza, ferrets are pretty good surrogates for humans). 
Complete  experimental  details  were  given  in  the  sub-
mitted manuscripts, including the specific substitutions. 
The NSABB argued that such details were too useful for 
would-be  terrorists  and  should  be  disseminated  only 
among carefully vetted flu researchers; the broad conclu-
sions were deemed safe for publication.
After some debate, the studies’ authors agreed to the 
censoring of the information, and joined with a number 
of  their  colleagues  in  calling  for  the  abovementioned 
60-day moratorium on such research. The stated purpose 
of  the  moratorium  was  to  give  scientific  organizations 
and  governments  time  to  formulate  policies  regarding 
these and similar experiments. Then, on 16-17 February, 
a group of 22 experts from around the globe met at WHO 
headquarters  in  Geneva  (I  guess  the  accommodation 
there is nicer than at Asilomar) to discuss the matter, and 
in  the  end  most  of  the  attendees  agreed  that  the 
hypothetical risk of the data being used by terrorists as 
part of a program to weaponize flu was outweighed by 
the need to understand how highly virulent strains of flu 
might emerge in the wild, and to share information that 
could be used to identify that such a strain was beginning 
to develop. (Interestingly, the US delegation was not part 
of this consensus: they agreed with the NSABB recom-
men  dation, and wanted the work published in redacted 
form.)
Many  scientists  are  concerned  that  any  censoring  of 
scientific publications constitutes the slipperiest of slopes. 
Censorship  is  the  first  power  that  totalitarian  regimes 
seek  to  acquire,  and  the  scissors,  in  the  memorable 
phrase of Leslie Charteris, can easily grow large enough 
to  snip  off  heads.  Other  researchers  assert  that  it’s 
impossible  to  restrict  the  flow  of  information  in  this 
internet-dominated age, so why even try? And then there 
is the argument made by the WHO group - also made by 
the papers’ authors themselves - that it is important to 
publish the results so that the appearance of such a lethal 
strain can be identified early and effective vaccines and 
drugs  against  it  can  be  developed  in  advance.  On  the 
other hand, there is the simple argument that the risks of 
such research vastly outweigh the benefits, and that it is 
foolish, to say the least, to make a would-be terrorist’s job 
so much easier.
My own view is that even these arguments miss the 
point.  Asilomar  should  have  taught  us  that  limited 
restrictions we as a community devise ourselves are far 
better than an assertion of freedom that is likely to be 
met with stiff governmental regulation or the erosion of 
public  trust  in  science.  Ignoring  the  public’s  concern, 
even when it might be overblown, also smacks of arro-
gance  and  ivory-tower  blindness  -  attitudes  certain  to 
lead to calls for severe government controls. We may not 
enjoy policing ourselves, but we’re far better off when we 
do.
How realistic are those concerns? To be honest, I’m not 
certain  that  the  work  in  question  is  going  to  be  that 
interesting to terrorists either - at least, not to the better-
known  organizations.  They  want  to  control  the  world, 
not obliterate it, and they tend to prefer technologically 
simple, chemical-based weapons that can be targeted to 
specific populations and institutions. One does need to 
worry about doomsday cults whose objective is to bring 
about the end of the world. They are not numerous but 
they can be lethal, as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the 
Japanese group responsible for the release of the nerve 
gas  sarin  in  a  Tokyo,  Japan,  subway  station  in  1995. 
Before that chemical attack, the cult is known to have 
dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism throughout 
Tokyo on at least eight occasions. Unlike the sarin attack, 
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the reasons for this failure are, troublingly, still unclear.
Furthermore,  in  considering  the  effectiveness  of 
restricting access to information, it’s also important to 
remember that big crime, including terrorism, is often an 
inside job. Recall that the anthrax letters were sent by a 
trusted  bioweapons  expert  who  worked  for  the  US 
government. He would almost certainly have been given 
access  to  the  details  of  the  H5N1  experiments  had  he 
asked for them.
Consider, too, that the US has pretty much cornered 
the market on vaccine against the H5N1 strain, owing to 
fears by the Bush administration that an outbreak might 
be  imminent  in  2005.  So  if  you’re  a  terrorist  bent  on 
destroying the US, would it make much sense to use a 
biological  weapon  that  your  primary  target  is  already 
prepared for?
Moreover, from the perspective of a sometime struc-
tural biologist, the whole discussion seems rather naïve 
about protein structure and function. It is well established 
that there are many different amino acid combinations 
that  produce  the  same  protein  fold  with  the  similar 
physical chemical properties. The likelihood that one set 
of substitutions obtained in the laboratory represent the 
only  way  -  or  even  the  most  probable  way  -  to  make 
H5N1 human transmissible by air, when the virus evolves 
in  the  wild,  is,  I  would  think,  extremely  small.  The 
probability  that  watching  for  those  specific  mutations 
would alert us to the outbreak of such a strain is therefore 
also small.
As you see, one goes back and forth about an issue this 
complicated. Yet, in the end, I keep coming back to two 
things. The first is that, when it comes to public discourse, 
perception  is  at  least  as  important  as  reality,  and  we 
ignore it at our peril. Public perception of science has 
shifted  in  recent  decades  from  one  of  the  scientist  as 
savior to one in which we are seen by many to be self-
absorbed glory-hounds, more interested in the pursuit of 
discovery and the rewards it brings than we are in the 
consequences our work may have for the well-being of 
society. What Frankenstein didn’t do to our reputation, 
the  atomic  bomb  and  years  of  antiscience  propaganda 
from certain politicians and religious leaders has done - 
and if you doubt me, watch any science fiction movie or 
monster/disaster film.
And those movies, while ridiculous, do have a sort of 
point to make, in that in the eye of many scientists, there 
is something almost erotic about dangerous work, not to 
mention  the  near  certainty  that  such  work  will  be 
published in the sexiest science journals.
So I think the moratorium was a good thing, overall, 
and I would have recommended that it be continued even 
longer  -  and  that  the  paper  be  published  without  the 
sensitive information - until we as a community find ways 
to  reassure  the  public  that  we  not  only  can  police 
ourselves  but  that  we  should.  It’s  the  best  strategy  for 
protecting our right to inquire, our freedom to explore, 
and  our  ability  to  communicate  with  each  other  the 
results  of  the  work  that  we  do.  If  that  means  we 
sometimes have to err on the side of caution, I don’t think 
the  price  is,  at  present  anyway,  too  high  to  pay.  As 
geneticist Janet Westpheling so eloquently put it, the only 
rules that work are the ones scientists honestly believe in 
as necessary and are willing to enforce themselves.
The second thing is that we are human beings and it’s 
silly, and possibly wrong, to pretend that we can, or even 
should, conduct our professional lives in a moral vacuum. 
We  should  always  question  the  purpose  and  ultimate 
result of what we do, before others ask those questions 
for us.
Considering  all  these  points,  I  must  say  that  the 
argument that the possible harm to the public perception 
of science from work like this probably outweighs any 
hypothetical  benefit  from  freely  disseminating  the 
information strikes me as a pretty good argument, and 
one I have yet to see refuted. But it also seems to me, in 
light of the arguments I have made here, that this debate 
should not be about publishing or not (which is probably 
moot  when  the  information  has  been  disseminated  so 
widely already and no terrorist is likely to want it). The 
issue we as a community should be debating is whether 
this particular experiment should have been performed 
at all.
My  final  take  on  the  flu  controversy?  The  H5N1 
researchers might have been within their rights to carry 
out the work they did, and might even have been within 
their rights to publish it. But I wouldn’t have done either 
of these things.
(Note: I have benefitted from a number of insightful 
comments and critiques on the draft of this column from 
well informed and highly placed friends. Those facts and 
ideas that are valid and valuable are due in large measure 
to their input, for which I am very grateful. They are in no 
way responsible for anything that might be incorrect or 
silly - those are on me.)
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